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Abstract

This article examines ‘the NIDA paradigm’, the theory that addiction is a chronic,
relapsing brain disease characterized by loss of control over drug taking. I critically review the
official history of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) paradigm and analyze the sources of
resistance to it. I argue that, even though the theory remains contested, it has yielded important
insights in other fields, including my own discipline of history.
BioSocieties (2010) 5, 137–147. doi:10.1057/biosoc.2009.3
Keywords: addiction; neuroscience; National Institute on Drug Abuse; drug policy; drug history;
medicalization

Introduction
It is a commonplace in the history of science that new paradigms generate both opposition
and unexpected insights. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) paradigm of
addiction as a brain disease has done both. The research behind it has expanded our
knowledge of motivation and learning, of normal as well as abnormal behavior. Yet it has
also been met with indifference, suspicion, and, in some cases, open resistance. I am
particularly interested in why politicians, clinicians and social scientists have been slow to
embrace what the neuroscientific community generally regards as a major breakthrough.
The key elements of the NIDA brain disease paradigm can be simply stated. They are that
addiction is a chronic, relapsing brain disease with a social context, a genetic (or, more
precisely, a gene-environment-stress-interactive) component, and significant comorbidity
with other mental and physical disorders. Although drug use often begins voluntarily, and
develops over time, users lose control with the onset of addiction. According to the former
NIDA director, Alan Leshner, addiction is defined, not by physical withdrawal symptoms,
but by ‘uncontrollable, compulsive drug craving, seeking, and use, even in the face of
negative health and social consequences’. Persistent use leads to long-term changes in brain
structure and function. Neurons become more responsive to the biochemical changes
triggered by drug consumption. Imaging studies have shown specific patterns of abnormal
activity in the brains of many addicts. In essence, addiction is a brain disease because addicts
exhibit a behavioral disorder that can be linked to observable pathological changes in their
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brains. To again quote Leshner, addiction is ‘the quintessential biobehavioral disorder’
(Leshner, 2001).

History
Where did this paradigm come from? Here is the official version, from the NIDA publication
Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction. It bears the signature of Nora
Volkow, the current NIDA director:
Throughout much of the last century, scientists studying drug abuse labored in the
shadows of powerful myths and misconceptions about the nature of addiction. When
science began to study addictive behavior in the 1930s, people addicted to drugs were
thought to be morally flawed and lacking in willpower. Those views shaped society’s
responses to drug abuse, treating it as a moral failing rather than a health problem,
which led to an emphasis on punitive rather than preventative and therapeutic actions.
Today, thanks to science, our views and our responses to drug abuse have changed
dramatically. Groundbreaking discoveries about the brain have revolutionized our
understanding of drug addiction, enabling us to respond effectively to the problem.
(National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2008, p. 1)
The statement evokes the Whiggish history of psychiatry. Substituting ‘mental illness’ for
addiction gives a textbook account of beneficent medicalization. We used to treat mentally
ill people as wicked or possessed, but now, thanks to neuroscience, we treat them as
patients. The paradigm shift was progressive in another way. It tidied things up. Making
the brain the affected organ, as historian Nancy Campbell has written, provided ‘a
unified framework for a problem-based field in conceptual disarray’ and enabled addiction
researchers to draw on the technical resources and social authority of neuroscience
(Campbell, 2007, p. 200).
The political subtext of Volkow’s statement is plain enough: keep funding our research.
What may be less obvious is that virtually every historical claim in the statement is either
factually incorrect or a form of wishful thinking. Let me start with the state of things
before the 1930s, a decade presumably chosen because it corresponds to the opening of the
federal narcotic hospitals and their research facilities. Neither popular nor medical opinion
then regarded all addicts as morally flawed. People distinguished between medical cases
and nonmedical addicts with underworld or delinquent backgrounds. All junkies were
addicts, but not all addicts were junkies.
There was also a good deal of scientific investigation before the 1930s. Psychiatrist
Lawrence Kolb, whom one colleague called ‘the Osler of drug addiction’, and who labored
longer and harder than anyone to establish that addiction was a true mental disease, began
his federally funded researches in 1923. These involved lab work with monkeys as well
as the systematic study of 230 human cases (Kolb, 1962; Courtwright, 2001a, Chapter 5;
Acker, 2002, Chapter 5). The relegation of Kolb’s work to the dustbin of prescientific history
may not have been entirely accidental. His primary finding, that nonmedical addiction was
rooted in psychopathy and other preexisting (and hard-to-treat) personality disorders, fit
138
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poorly with the politics of medicalization and the NIDA paradigm’s foundational metaphor,
that drugs could flip the addiction ‘switch’ in even normal brains.
Ultimately, it may turn out that the tension between the personality and brain disease
models is more apparent than real. Recent research has found that impulsive, thrill-seeking
individuals have fewer D2 and D3 dopamine receptors in the ventral midbrain region, which
means they have less inhibition of dopamine and experience more reward when stimulated
by risky behavior (Sanders, 2008). The propensity to addiction and certain kinds of
personality disorder may have genetic and/or epigenetic common denominators. This
possibility also has been debated for a long time. Early twentieth-century researchers
investigating cigarettes and health pondered whether the type of individual attracted to
smoking might be as causally important in explaining the moral and physical harms of the
habit as tobacco itself (Brandt, 2007, Chapter 4).
Other researchers – mostly asylum proprietors, psychiatrists and public-health physicians –
were thinking systematically about the nature of addiction even before Kolb began his work
in the 1920s. What happened in the late twentieth century was essentially the confirmation
and recasting of a series of shrewd hypotheses that these pioneers ventured. They held that
alcohol, tobacco and other drug addictions were related through a common pathological
action on the nervous system, which was permanently altered by the repeated use of drugs.
Indeed, they often referred to nicotine and alcohol as ‘narcotics’ or ‘deadly narcotics’. They
believed that loss of control was the most important and troubling aspect of addiction. They
knew how to get patients through withdrawal. The big challenge was how to prevent
relapse. They postulated that some individuals were more vulnerable to addiction than
others, whether through an inherited vulnerability or through an acquired, stress-related
impairment of their nervous systems. In short, they believed that addiction was a chronic,
recurrent nervous disease with both an environmental and hereditary component. What they
lacked was the means to prove it (Courtwright, 2005).
The history of addiction as a brain disease looks a lot like the history of atoms or germs,
insofar as these were all older and controversial ideas for which scientific confirmation later
became available. Improved instrumentation and new laboratory techniques, together with
the infusion of money and research talent into the field, made possible the fundamental
discoveries in the second half of the twentieth century that served as the building blocks of the
current NIDA paradigm. Among these were the observation of intracranial self-stimulation in
rats; the discovery of an endogenous opioid system; the mapping of specific receptors and
description of their functions; an understanding of drug sensitization and dendritic morphology; the piecing together of a mesolimbic dopamine reward pathway that was distinct from
the anatomical pathways responsible for physical dependence and withdrawal syndromes;
and, more recently, the location of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (‘snips’, or minute
variations in DNA sequences) that seem to correlate with the risk of becoming an addict.
Dramatic improvements in neuroimaging also made possible the equivalent of Giovanni
Morgagni’s clinico-pathological studies. Morgagni pioneered the anatomical concept of
disease. He based his classic 1761 study, De Sedibus et Causis Morborum, on some 700 case
studies that showed how diseases with characteristic symptoms affected particular organs
that exhibited characteristic lesions on postmortem examination. Imaging made it possible
to show patterns of pre-mortem change on the primary organ that addiction afflicts, the
brain. This idea is made explicit in Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, which juxtaposes positron
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emission tomography (PET) scans of a healthy and diseased heart with those of a healthy
brain and the ‘diseased brain’ of a cocaine abuser. ‘Addiction is similar to other diseases,
such as heart disease’, the caption explains. ‘Both disrupt the normal, healthy functioning of
the underlying organ, have serious harmful consequences, are preventable, treatable, and if
left untreated, can last a lifetime’ (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2008, p. 5).
Some individuals do respond well to treatment. Yet the new paradigm has not led to
a large increase in our ability to ‘respond effectively to the problem’, as Volkow claims.
Here is the practical heart of the matter. The prevalence and incidence of drug abuse are
largely determined by demographic variables like migration, family stability and birth
cohort size, as well as social forces like drug-financed civil wars within failed states,
pharmaceutical marketing strategies, bohemian fashion and generational learning (and
forgetting) about the dangers of certain drugs. Pathological understanding is still
disconnected from disease control, which is unusual in the history of medicine and public
health. As psychiatrist Sally Satel puts it, a disease concept is not of much use unless it leads
to ‘actionable etiology’ (Satel, 2009).

Resistance
Volkow makes another questionable claim. With the exception of medical marijuana and
marijuana decriminalization initiatives in some states, there is little evidence that popular
attitudes toward drug abuse have ‘changed dramatically’ in the United States in the recent
past. Strikingly, federal policy toward illicit drugs became more, not less, punitive as the
brain disease paradigm was solidifying in the 1980s and 1990s. Volkow’s statement boils
down to a claim about successful medicalization. But the drug-abuse field is characterized
by, at best, incomplete and contested medicalization. As the French sociologist, Robert
Castel, has observed, western medicine turned madness into a disease during the nineteenth
century, and created institutions and therapies for managing it. But this has not happened for
addiction, at least not to the same extent (Castel, 2008).
Instead, at least four important groups continue to wrestle for control of the addiction
field. Medical personnel are concerned with addicts as patients. Police have a stake because
addictive behavior often leads to crime and personal and social harms. Social scientists
regard addiction as a social construction as well as a form of social behavior. Political actors,
by which I mean organized interest groups as well as appointed officials and elected
politicians, are in some ways the most important players, because they ultimately determine
the details of drug control and addiction treatment policies.
One way to describe the modern history of US policy toward nonmedical drug use and
addiction is to describe the varying fortunes of these four groups. Law enforcement
dominated from the early 1920s to the mid-1960s, a period historians call ‘the classic era of
narcotic control’ – classic in the sense of simple and rigid (Acker, 2002, p. 7). But, from the
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, medical and, to a lesser degree, social-scientific actors gained
in influence. This was a time of promising new therapeutic approaches, methadone
maintenance, the birth of NIDA, the efflorescence of drug ethnography, and a growing
audience for the work of sociologists and historians who dissented from the official line. Yet
the era of drug glasnost was brief. Law enforcement personnel regained their influence in the
140
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late 1970s and 1980s, even as NIDA was gathering the early fruits of the new scientific
investigations. That raises an obvious question: why did the politicians not jump on the
medicalization bandwagon? They were, after all, providing the funding that made the brain
disease breakthrough possible.
The short answer is that American politicians had discovered an even more appealing
bandwagon, that of selective reaction. What was being reacted against was the rise in crime,
race riots, youthful drug experimentation, sexual permissiveness and liberal fecklessness
broadly associated with the 1960s. Beginning with Ronald Reagan’s successful run for the
California governorship in 1966 and Richard Nixon’s successful run for the presidency in
1968, appeals to popular illiberalism became an important part of Republican electoral
strategy.
Yet Republicans faced a dilemma. They could run for office as social reactionaries, but
they could not govern as social reactionaries, at least not across the board. No one was going
to recriminalize abortion, bring back mandatory prayer in school, roll back civil rights,
reimpose censorship and hang on to centrist voters. What they could and eventually did do
was to selectively address backlash issues where a large majority, centrists included,
demanded change. The three most important of these, all intertwined with race, class and
gender, were criminal sentencing, welfare reform and the drug war.
Richard Nixon was the first Republican president to declare and fight a drug war, albeit
one that initially combined novel medical and law enforcement approaches to the problem.
The political appeal of a more narrowly punitive policy became apparent in January 1973
when New York governor and perennial presidential hopeful, Nelson Rockefeller, proposed
mandatory life sentences for drug traffickers. Enough was enough, Rockefeller said.
Polls showed that two-thirds of the state’s residents agreed with him (Massing, 1998,
pp. 126–128). Nixon immediately grasped the electoral logic of strict mandatory sentences.
‘Rocky can ride the thing for all it’s worth’, he told his aides, Bob Haldeman and
John Ehrlichman (Nixon, 1973). Three months later Nixon imitatively proposed his own
increases in federal penalties for heroin trafficking.
The escalation of the Watergate scandal in the spring and summer of 1973 derailed
Nixon’s proposal, and much else in his domestic program. However, when Republicans
returned to the White House in 1981, the drug issue still afforded excellent political
opportunities. It gave First Lady Nancy Reagan the means to make over her image, and to
ultimately win approval ratings higher than her popular husband’s. It gave President Reagan
the chance to deliver one of his most dramatic and popular speeches, the 14 September
1986 drug war declaration, which he made jointly with the first lady. It gave President
George H. W. Bush the occasion for his first nationally televised address, in which he
displayed a bag of crack seized near the White House. It gave drug czar, Bill Bennett, a bully
pulpit and the opportunity to burnish his ‘culture warrior’ credentials. And it gave President
George W. Bush, who approved annual drug control budget increases, another outlet for his
big-stick, big-government conservatism.
What the drug war gave Democrats was mostly headaches. It contributed to the 1994
downfall of Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders who, among her other liberal sins, had
suggested the possibility of studying drug legalization. It prevented President Bill Clinton
from moving too fast to embrace medicalization or harm reduction for fear that he would be
judged a weak drug warrior. For reasons of ideology and moral temperament, Democrats
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were (and remain) the party most open to medicalization. But Democratic politicians knew,
from bitter experience, that they would pay a price for looking soft on drugs – just as Clinton
understood that he would pay a price if he did not sign the 1996 welfare reform bill passed
by a Republican Congress (Courtwright, forthcoming).
Beyond partisan calculation, there was a more subtle reason why NIDA officials failed to lure
political actors away from the drug war. It was that their paradigm reinforced the logic of strict
supply reduction. Like the sheet that has been dyed, the addicted brain could never become
unaddicted. It was possible to learn to live with the new color, but the surest answer was
prevention: keep the dye away from the sheet. As John D. Rockefeller Sr. liked to tell his Sunday
school classes, you cannot become a drunkard if you never take your first drink (Chernow,
1998, p. 190). Harry Anslinger, longtime head of the Bureau of Narcotics, made a similar point
about morphine and other medicinal narcotics. Why, Anslinger wanted to know, did doctors
have rates of addiction that were so much higher than lawyers? Was it because doctors as a class
were weaker or more sociopathic than lawyers? No, it was simply that doctors were exposed to
drugs in a way that lawyers were not. At bottom, the rate of addiction was a function of
availability. Controlling availability was therefore priority one (Maisel, 1945).
The same reasoning applied to cannabis or cocaine or any other addictive substance. The
ultimate point of spraying illicit crops and hunting down traffickers and imposing prison
terms was to reduce the prevalence of addiction and related problems like overdose and
accidents. Tellingly, the Drug Enforcement Administration all but plagiarized NIDA’s
language to describe the long-term dangers of drugs like methamphetamine. Abuse could
trigger addiction, ‘a chronic, relapsing disease, characterized by compulsive drug-seeking
and drug use which is accompanied by functional and molecular changes in the brain’ (DEA,
2009). The flipped switch served as both a warning to the unwary and a policy trump
card. Drug war critics could still criticize specific tactics as ineffectual or counterproductive
or too costly. But, if the brain disease model was correct, and drug exposure led ineluctably
to catastrophic addiction in a significant percentage of cases, the fundamental strategy of
prosecution to reduce supply was hard to fault.
The usual rebuttal was that law enforcement efforts to reduce supply often backfired. Legal
pressure in one place encouraged clandestine manufacturing in others, just as the disruption
of existing trafficking routes encouraged smugglers to find alternatives. Sooner or later, illicit
drugs began ‘leaking out’ wherever they were manufactured or transshipped. The result was
more widespread abuse among previously low-use populations – as happened in Mexico,
where the number of addicts reportedly doubled between 2002 and 2009 (Beith, 2009).
The surrebuttal was that drug use spread even faster when unregulated or poorly
regulated, as evidenced by the many and far-flung drug epidemics of the nineteenth century.
Concomitants or not, the principle of utility dictated that modern states punish those who
sold dangerous drugs outside approved medical channels. More practically, the ‘push-down,
pop-up’ effects of enforcement were often remote, a problem in someone else’s backyard.
What Republicans responded to in the 1970s and 1980s was growing pressure from
organized and influential middle-class constituents to do something right now about the
threat to their children. That the policy response got caught up in the current of competitive
moral politics and overshot the falls of legislative reaction was in no way NIDA’s doing. Yet,
in hindsight, the agency’s new science backed up the message of the old drug-frying-pan
commercial: once your kid’s brain plopped into sizzling neurotoxic grease, it stayed fried.
142
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The metaphor can be turned around: authorities do not ordinarily punish juvenile burn
victims, even if they happened to be playing with matches. Although the brain disease
paradigm offered aid and comfort to the supply-siders, it also furnished a moral argument to
their opponents. If addiction was beyond the individual’s control, then criminal punishment
was as inappropriate as jailing a schizophrenic who wandered into an emergency room. ‘The
initial decision to take drugs is mostly voluntary’, explains Drugs, Brains, and Behavior.
‘However, when drug abuse takes over, a person’s ability to exert self control becomes
seriously impaired. Brain imaging studies from drug-addicted individuals show’ – Morgagni
again – ‘physical changes in areas of the brain that are critical to judgment, decisionmaking
[sic], learning and memory, and behavior control’ (NIDA, 2008, p. 7).
Pathological loss of control has long been a fundamental consideration of medical
ethics. Moreover, it seems unlikely that post-1973 US policy would have assumed such
a punitive character if physicians had actively opposed it. Organized medicine was hardly
without political influence. It had successfully exercised that influence on other occasions –
notably in opposition to national health insurance – to block legislation that commanded
widespread support. If it was becoming clear in the 1980s and 1990s that addiction really
was a brain disease, why did the medical profession and its allies fail to put up much of
a fight against the prison-oriented drug war? Why, for that matter, are they still largely
acquiescent?
The most obvious answer is that the brain disease model has so far failed to yield much
practical therapeutic value. Clinicians have acquired some drugs, such as Wellbutrin and
Chantix for smokers, Campral for alcoholics or buprenorphine for heroin addicts, but no
magic bullets. Stuck in therapeutic limbo, with pathological insight but little ability to cure
the underlying pathology, they have had no routine clinical alternative to the dominant
supply-side approaches.
Counterfactually, if the brain disease model ever yields a pharmacotherapy that curbs
craving, or a vaccine that blocks drug euphoria, as some researchers hope (Condon, 2006),
we should expect the rapid medicalization of the field. Under those dramatically costeffective circumstances, politicians and police would be more willing to surrender authority
to physicians. Even if they were not so disposed, the fiscal burden of mass imprisonment has
reached the point where voters might force them to do so. Pharmaceutical companies would
also have a financial interest in using any therapeutic discoveries to medicalize addiction, as
they have with Viagra and ‘erectile dysfunction’, human growth hormone and ‘idiopathic
short stature’, and Paxil and shyness, rechristened ‘social anxiety disorder’ (Conrad, 2007).
Another reason for clinicians’ acceptance of the status quo was that the drug war, for all
its excesses, never seriously endangered their ability to prescribe mood-altering drugs.
Richard DeGrandpre has criticized the division of the pharmacopeia into nonmedical ‘devil’
drugs and medical ‘angel’ drugs. The latter, he argues, were protected and privileged by
pharmaceutical interests, bureaucrats and medical researchers, including the NIDA brain
disease establishment. Whether or not current drug scheduling is actually irrational (or, for
that matter, dichotomous), it has never been so aggressive that organized medicine felt it had
to revolt. On the contrary, many critics think that prescribing remains underregulated.
Doctors, abetted by big-name researchers in the pay of pharmaceutical companies, have
been prescribing far too many unproven and dangerous psychoactive drugs for far too many
patients, including young children (DeGrandpre, 2006; Angell, 2009).
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Finally, why were social scientists slow to embrace the NIDA paradigm? Some of them,
like psychologists Stanton Peele (1998) and Bruce Alexander (2008), simply thought it was
wrong on its merits, that it was reductively inattentive to individual values and social
context. DeGrandpre has similarly argued that it is set and setting that matter, not just
neurons pickled in a sea of exogenous toxins. Beyond that, there were strong disciplinary
biases at work. Social scientists have long been collectively suspicious of anything that
smacks of biological essentialism. Biological explanations, after all, have a notorious dark
side, having been used to stigmatize, exploit and exterminate minority groups. On one level,
social-scientific skepticism about the NIDA paradigm was part of a broader post-World War
II pattern of resistance against biological explanations of behavior, genetic research and the
neo-Darwinian renaissance (Degler, 1991).
Although that resistance has recently shown signs of abating, it is still very much in
evidence among social science’s old guard. Troy Duster, an influential sociologist who has
written on drugs, deviance, race and science, highlighted the concern in his 2005 presidential
address to the American Sociological Association. He spoke frankly of the challenge of
scientific authority and ‘the attendant expansion of data bases on markers and processes
‘‘inside the body’’’. For Duster, reductionist science was the enemy at the gates, threatening
to further defund and marginalize sociology, draw attention from the decisive social and
economic forces, and dominate the policy process (Duster, 2006, p. 1).
Another way to say this is that both social scientists and neuroscientists still live in their
own gated academic communities, that they engage in vigorous boundary maintenance, and
that they champion their own disciplinary and subdisciplinary master variables. There is a
lot more at stake in the brain disease debate than our understanding of addiction. At bottom,
it is really a high-stakes argument about how we ought to understand human behavior,
motivation and pleasure – and about what policies we should adopt to regulate it.

Spinoffs
Yet such academic resistance in no way implies the failure of the brain disease theory. All
new scientific paradigms encounter opposition, much of it socially or politically motivated.
Paradigms that can both explain familiar problems and unresolved puzzles usually win out
in the end, assuming the mantle of the new ‘normal science’ (Kuhn, 1970).
One of the NIDA paradigm’s strengths has been its ability to shed light on fundamental
research questions in other fields, such as the neuronal basis of learning and memory, or the
nature of behavioral addictions. Researchers have shown that reward cues ‘light up’ the
same neural pathways in behavioral and drug addictions, and that opiate antagonists like
Naltrexone have value in treating disorders like compulsive gambling (Vrecko, 2010). These
striking findings legitimate the idea that some people with bad habits are genuinely addicted.
They also reinforce the NIDA paradigm. Scientists favor theories that prove to be both
parsimonious and unifying, such as Darwinian evolution. In fact, the NIDA paradigm
extends evolutionary theory. Michael Kuhar has argued that, because the brain co-evolved
with neurotransmitters, it can usually manage its internal chemistry quite well. But it did not
co-evolve with drugs, understood as recently introduced and wholly exogenous superneurotransmitters that can override the brain’s control mechanisms. Drugs can stimulate
144
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reward neurons for minutes or hours instead of the usual milliseconds before reuptake. No
wonder drugs and their cues make such a lasting impression on the memory, or have such
potential to impair judgment (Kuhar, 2010).
This brings me to my own research. Whatever defects I may have identified in its official
history, I count myself among the beneficiaries of the NIDA paradigm. It guided me when I
wrote Forces of Habit, a study of the spread and commercialization of the planet’s
psychoactive resources. I noticed that the most commercially popular drugs invariably
affected, whether strongly or weakly, directly or indirectly, the reward system that
neuroscientists now held to be central to both motivation and craving. That could not be a
coincidence. Dopamine reward helped explain why an exotic, bizarrely consumed,
seemingly diabolical drug like tobacco, which often met with fierce official resistance,
caught on wherever it was introduced in the early modern world. Dopamine reward also
helped explain why exposure mattered so much, and why proximity to supply was by far the
most important variable for explaining addiction rates in different countries.
Research on the ways drugs synergistically increased dopamine levels helped me
understand why novel combination practices, like smoking tobacco while drinking spirits,
had taken root together. The permanent alteration of neurons and the development of
addiction in some, but not all, users also helped explain the commercial and tax appeal of
drugs, insofar as they were nondurable goods with relatively inflexible demand curves. Even
non-addicted users tended to consume more over time, because of tolerance (Courtwright,
2001b, Chapter 5). Of course, biology was not the whole story. Social influences, as when
young people smoked in imitation of adults, also played important roles. But the larger point
remains. Someone in an unrelated discipline, history, was able to draw on NIDA-sponsored
research to gain insight and solve puzzles.
This suggests one final analogy. The NIDA paradigm and the neuroscience behind it may
yet prove to be a scaled-down version of the manned space program. Even though NASA
failed to achieve its central long-term objective – cheap, routine and dependable human
access to space – it nevertheless demonstrated the possibility of travel beyond the
atmosphere and produced any number of ‘spinoffs’. Among those claimed by NASA were
programmable heart pacemakers, waste purification, solar energy, cordless appliances, laser
surgery, liquid crystal displays, epoxy adhesives, portable computers, parallel processing and
digital body imaging – the last, of course, a key tool for NIDA researchers (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1992). Although it is too soon to pronounce
judgment, it seems possible that NIDA’s own brain disease research will follow a similar
trajectory. That is, it can fail in its central political objective – the medicalization of a
treatable disease – and yet still succeed in winning scientific converts and sparking
innovations in other fields. It would not, after all, be the first time that policy and science
went their separate ways.
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